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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The term “Dark Net” is loosely defined, but most frequently 
refers to an area of the Internet only accessible by using 
an encryption tool called The Onion Router (Tor). Tor is 
a tool aimed at those desiring privacy online, although 
frequently attracts those with criminal intentions. An 
innovative feature of Tor is the ability to host websites 
anonymously and with a degree of impunity — designed 
to be used by those in repressive regimes who wish to host 
whistle-blowing or political content.
The study described in this paper collected data on the Tor 
Dark Net over a period of six months to analyze the type 
and popularity of the content. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the majority of sites were criminally oriented, with drug 
marketplaces featuring prominently. Notably, however, it 
was found that sites hosting child abuse imagery were the 
most frequently requested.
INTRODUCTION
Tor is an open-source tool that aims to provide anonymity 
and privacy to those using the Internet. It prevents someone 
who is observing the user from identifying which sites they 
are visiting and it prevents the sites from identifying the 
user. Some users value Tor’s anonymity because it makes 
it difficult for governments to censor sites or content that 
may be hosted elsewhere in the world.
Tor has a critical mass of users, averaging two million 
per day as of June 2015 (Tor Project 2015), and is thus 
frequently cited as one of the key tools against government 
surveillance. Somewhat paradoxically, the Tor Project (the 
non-profit organization that manages Tor) receives the 
majority of its funding from the US government.
Tor volunteers run thousands of “relays,” a server that 
any other user can ask to route traffic through. Figure 1 
illustrates the simple case of a single relay, with three users 
asking it to route traffic to three sites. An observer can 
see traffic entering and leaving the relay, but they cannot 
determine which user is visiting which site (save for 
correlation attacks, which will be discussed later) because 
the traffic is encrypted; however, if the relay operator is 
malicious, they can trivially (with ease, from a technical 
standpoint) link the two.
Figure 1: Illustration of Relay-mixing Traffic
Relay
Site A
Site B
Site C
User A
User B
User C
Observer
Source: Authors.
When a user visits any sites through a relay, his traffic 
appears to come from the relay rather than the user’s 
computer. Thus, the user remains anonymous to the site 
itself.
To defend against a malicious relay operator, the user 
chooses three relays and chains them together, labelling 
them as the Guard, Middle and Exit, known as a three-
hop circuit (see Figure 2).This raises the bar significantly 
for an attacker who would then need to control all three 
relays to be able to link users with certainty to the sites 
they are visiting. It is the user who chooses the three relays; 
the attacker is unable to influence his choice/decision. 
An attacker’s only option would thus be to control a 
significant number of relays in the hope that a user chooses 
three within that controlled pool — this is thought to be 
impractical.
Figure 2: Typical Three-hop Tor Circuits
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Source: Authors.
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HIDDEN SERVICES
While the ability to access the Internet anonymously 
is valuable in countries where personal freedoms are 
restricted, it is only one feature of Tor (Jardine, n.d.).The 
other major feature is “hidden services” (HSes), the ability 
to host a website (or Internet service) anonymously. In 
this case, both the visitor and the site are anonymous to 
each other. Using this feature, political blogs or forums can 
be hosted in repressive regimes without fear of penalty. 
As with any technology such as this, it also allows the 
possibility of criminally oriented material to be hosted 
with a degree of impunity. The collection of Tor HSes is 
often referred to as the Dark Net, although there exist 
other, less popular tools that might also be considered 
under this umbrella (for example, the Invisible Internet 
Project, known as I2P).
It is crucial to know how hidden services work to be 
able to understand the methodology used in measuring 
activity on the Dark Net. Let’s assume Bob is hosting an 
HS and Alice wishes to visit his site. When Bob first creates 
his site, he constructs a document detailing “introduction 
points,” or relays within the network that will be able to 
relay messages to him. He publishes this document in a 
distributed hash table (DHT), which can be thought of as 
a database or phone directory distributed across all the 
relays in the network — that is, no single relay controls or 
possesses all of the DHT at any one point in time. To create 
such a database, all the relays in the network are placed 
onto a circle and ordered according to a unique identifier 
(see Figure 3, relays are labelled hi).The HS is then mapped 
onto the circle at two points. Bob publishes information on 
his introduction points to the three relays to the right of 
each of these two locations, so that copies exist on exactly 
six relays. When publishing the information, he uses a 
three-hop circuit to remain anonymous to the directory 
relay.
Figure 3: Tor HS Directory (DHT)
Source: Authors.
The location that Bob publishes to in this directory appears 
random, and changes every day, but it is possible for Alice 
to figure out his information. The location changes daily to 
make it more difficult for one person to control the relays 
that hold Bob’s information.
Alice then calculates which relays on the circle contain 
Bob’s information and builds three-hop circuits to the 
relays, requesting a copy of his information. By using a 
three-hop circuit, she remains anonymous to the directory 
relays. She now has information on Bob’s introduction 
points and relays a message to one of them asking Bob 
to build a connection to a rendezvous relay that she 
chooses. The rendezvous relay proceeds to relay messages 
between Bob and Alice, and since both have connected to 
the rendezvous relay through three-hop circuits, the relay 
does not know the identity of either party. The rendezvous 
relay cannot inspect the traffic because it is encrypted; its 
service is wholly altruistic.
RELATED WORK
HSes were described in the original Tor Paper (Dingledine, 
Mathewson and Syverson 2004) and have since 
undergone several revisions. They are difficult to locate 
geographically, but they use a DHT (similar to those used 
in many other distributed Internet applications (Stoica et 
al. 2001)) to publish descriptors with information on how 
to connect to them. The Tor DHT is not resistant to Sybil 
attacks (Douceur 2002), in which one can run many nodes 
and gain control of a large proportion of the DHT. With 
that control, one can collect HS descriptors (as described 
in this paper) and deny service to legitimate users. There 
exist a number of Sybil-resistant DHT implementations 
(Lesniewski-Laas and Kaashoek 2010), but as of yet, Tor 
has not focused significantly on this aspect.
The Tor DHT consists of approximately 3,000 participating 
relays, and each must have been operating persistently 
for several days before it can participate in the DHT. 
Furthermore, one can operate only two relays per Internet 
Protocol (IP) address to increase the cost of launching a 
Sybil attack. Researchers at Luxembourg University (see 
Biryukov, Pustogarov and Weinmann 2013) describe a bug 
in the Tor core program that allows someone to launch a 
large number of relays on a single computer and selectively 
phase any into the network. Tor logs relays’ uptime, even 
if they were not in the network, thus making it possible to 
launch a number of relays on a single computer. Biryukov, 
Pusatogarov and Weinmann took advantage of this bug 
and were able to collect the list of HS addresses in fewer 
than two days; however, the Tor Project has now fixed 
this bug. The authors used an automated classification 
algorithm to classify hidden sites into categories by 
content type. Their data shows they encountered popular 
abuse sites but chose to label them as “Adult”— an 
unfortunate side effect of the classification technique used. 
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Additionally, they only examined HSes present during a 
single 24-hour period. Therefore, the general question of 
the size, content and popularity of the Dark Net remains 
open. This paper addresses the question by collecting data 
over a significantly longer period of time and manually 
classifying sites to achieve greater precision.
STUDY OF HSes
To collect information on the Dark Net, a list of HSes must 
first be enumerated. By controlling all the relays in the Tor 
DHT, it is possible to collect a complete list of HSes by 
recording the descriptors as they have been published. It 
is then possible to count the number of requests for each 
descriptor and estimate their relative popularity.
Unfortunately, there are approximately 3,000 relays in 
the DHT, and even though one can create relays that 
participate in the DHT, it is impossible to control all of it. 
There is also a non-negligible cost associated with each 
participating relay one wishes to run. If one runs a handful 
of DHT participants, then one can observe a fraction of it 
at any one point in turn. Bearing in mind that HSes publish 
to two essentially random points every day, over time one 
would observe every HS that remained online during the 
collection period.
In this study, 40 relays were operated for a period of 
six months. Each relay recorded a list of published HS 
descriptors and the number of requests for each. Although 
only a small proportion of the DHT was observed each 
day, cumulatively all of the DHT was observed many 
times throughout the study.
SIZE AND TURNOVER ESTIMATION
Little has been known about the Dark Net to date, although 
a 2013 study estimated that there were 60,000 HSes at 
any one time (ibid.); however, this study was based on 
a single day and it was not known whether this was an 
outlier. Extrapolating from this paper’s data for each day, 
it is possible to give an estimate for the number of HSes 
existing on any one day (see Figure 4).
While on first observation it looks as if the number of HSes 
has high variance from day to day, one must bear in mind 
that only a small proportion of the DHT is being observed 
and then extrapolated. This means that errors will be 
amplified and this accounts for the variance. The long-term 
average throughout the study was 45,000 active sites and 
this is likely to be more indicative of the total number of 
HSes. In total, 80,000 unique HSes were observed during 
the study, but some only existed for a short period of time.
Figure 4: Estimate of the Number of HSes  
on Each Day of the Study
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Figure 5: Number of Days an HS was  
Observed During the Study
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While observing a fraction of the circle throughout the 
study, and bearing in mind that an HS publishes to two 
random points on the DHT circle each day, one would 
expect to see a long-lived HS publish again and again to 
the relays. Figure 5 shows the number of days an HS was 
observed during the study. The largest number of HSes 
were only seen once, which suggests that they existed for 
a short period of time and were never seen again. Longer-
lived HSes accounted for only 15 percent of all HSes. 
Therefore, one can conclude that while there are many 
HSes, most only exist for a short period of time and are not 
long-lived services. The reason for this is unknown.
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Figure 6: HSes that Persisted More than 18 Months
Disappeared 
Persisted 
New 
Source: Authors.
To further confirm the hypothesis that HSes have a high 
turnover, the authors of an earlier study (Biryukov, 
Pustogarov and Weinmann 2013) were approached to 
provide their collected list. Figure 6 shows the number of 
HSes that disappeared, persisted or been created between 
the two studies. As one might expect, given the previous 
results, most HSes did not persist for long and many newer 
ones had replaced them.
AUTHENTICATED HSes
Tor allows HSes to be authenticated in such a way that 
one cannot locate the position on the DHT circle without 
knowing a secret, such as a password; therefore, unless 
one knows the secret, the service cannot be accessed. On 
the directory relays, it is trivial to identify the descriptors 
belonging to authenticated HSes, because they are 
encrypted with the secret and so one can simply count 
encrypted descriptors (although not decrypt them). During 
this study, only 0.6 percent of HSes were authenticated. 
The content of these HSes is unknown, as without the 
secret it is impossible to access them.
CONTENT AND POPULARITY 
ANALYSIS
CLASSIFICATION
An HS does not have to be a website but could be, for 
example, a chat room, a file server or any other form of 
Internet service. There is no mechanism in Tor to find 
out which services are available for use by visitors, and 
the only way to discover them is to try each in turn (see 
Biryukov, Pustogarov and Weinmann 2013 for further 
analysis). Web pages were nearly universally offered by 
the most frequently requested HSes. To identify the type 
of content available, a custom crawler was developed that 
would connect to each HS, download web content and 
extract key data points. These data points were then used 
for classification of content type.
Classification of web pages is a difficult task, and while 
there exist automatic classifiers based on machine learning, 
the dataset in this case was small enough that manual 
classification was not unduly onerous. Additionally, the 
authors felt that given the range and complex, technical 
nature of some of the content, automatic classifiers would 
be insufficient due to difficulty in interpreting context and 
meaning (Samarawickrama and Jayaratne 2011).
Deciding when to crawl is not straightforward. At first 
glance, one may assume that crawling throughout the 
study is the logical approach; however, in doing so, one 
will overrepresent short-lived HSes, most of which were 
not online concurrently. Instead, the preferred approach is 
to take a snapshot of the content at a particular period in 
time; having observed the turnover and short longevity of 
services, the crawling took place over a one-month period 
toward the end of the study. It is acknowledged that there 
is room for imprecision, but there is presently no better 
approach available. As there is a high turnover of HSes, 
this is not significant.
It was considered at the outset that some HSes may contain 
content that was obscene or otherwise illegal to download, 
and it was more than likely that if this content existed it 
would be in the form of multimedia or images; hence, 
the crawler only fetched textual content from each HS, 
parsed key data points and stored them in a database. The 
crawled data were inspected to produce a list of categories 
that covered the majority of the content. Afterward, each 
site was manually examined and classified into distinct 
categories. Where a site spanned two categories, the 
authors chose the category that more precisely described 
the overwhelming or primary purpose.
While there is often debate about the division of illegal 
and legal content on the Dark Net, it is difficult to classify 
sites into either legal or illegal due to discrepancies and 
intricacies between legal jurisdictions: for example, 
whistle-blowing sites are often considered legal, but 
may not be if used to disclose classified documents or by 
persons in repressive regimes. Therefore, classification into 
legal versus illegal has not been undertaken. That said, the 
majority of sites on the Tor Dark Net are likely to be illegal 
(or considered immoral) in many Western countries.
The classification categories are as follows, with notable 
examples where appropriate:
• Abuse: sites where the title indicates some form of 
sexual abuse (typically minors), likely to be illegal in 
most Western jurisdictions. Sadly, these pages were 
easily identifiable from the metadata, suggesting 
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webmasters had confidence that Tor would provide 
robust anonymity. For some sites, it was difficult 
to discern whether they were facilitating abuse or 
providing adult pornographic services, and due to 
legal restrictions we were unwilling to download 
images to confirm. Where this was the case, the site 
was put into the porn category.
• Anonymity: sites aimed at promoting (or teaching) 
the use of anonymity tools or anonymous culture.
• Bitcoin: currency exchange from a mainstream 
currency to bitcoin, but more often money-
laundering services.
• Blog: personal or topical blog, often covering topics 
such as hacktivism. 
• Books: ebook service typically offering copyrighted 
material for free.
• Chat: web-based chat service, excluding services 
such as Jabber and Internet Relay Chat.
• Counterfeit: sites offering counterfeit items; notable 
fake currency, such as notes, or fake passports/
identity documents.
• Directory: site offering links to other sites within the 
Dark Net, often used for discovering other sites.
• Drugs: the sale or purchase of narcotics; typically, 
marketplaces connecting buyers and sellers.
• Forum: web-based forum whose primary purpose 
does not fit into another category; for example, 
generalist forum.
• Fraud: sites attempting to obtain a pecuniary 
advantage by deception.
• Gambling: any site that promotes/supports 
gambling. Bitcoin gambling services were most 
prevalent here, whereby users would first convert 
their fiat currency to bitcoin.
• Guns: sites exclusively aimed at selling guns.
• Hacking: site providing instructional information 
on illegal computer hacking.
• Hosting: Dark Net hosting service allowing users to 
host another Dark Net site.
• Mail: Dark Net web-based email or messaging 
service; examples include Mail2Tor and the now 
defunct TorMail.
• Market: a marketplace selling items other than 
drugs or services covered in other categories.
• News: news service such as current affairs or news 
specific to the Dark Net.
• Porn: Pornography sites that carry material that 
would be legal in most Western jurisdictions.
• Search: site providing a search engine-type service; 
one example is Ahmia.
• Whistleblower: sites typically operated by 
journalists for whistleblowers to submit documents. 
The GlobaLeaks platform (Hermes Center for 
Transparency and Digital Human Rights 2014) 
and SecureDrop platform (Freedom of the Press 
Foundation 2014) were prominently featured in this 
category.
• Wiki: user-editable content, such as the Hidden 
Wiki.
POPULARITY
The popularity data here shows the number of requests 
made for the descriptor for a particular HS. Bearing in 
mind the earlier point about the Tor program caching 
descriptors, one can interpret the number of requests as 
between the number of visits and the number of visitors. 
Due to the anonymity offered by Tor, it is not possible to 
link two separate requests to the same person, but since 
their computer will remember descriptors until the Tor 
software is restarted, it often will not make multiple 
requests within a 24-hour period.
Table 1 shows the popularity of HSes for which the 
authors received a descriptor request, but did not received 
a publication during the study. These are addresses that no 
longer exist, but are still being requested by Tor clients. In 
many cases, it was possible to identify the purpose of these 
now extinct HSes by examining online malware reports or 
by word prefixes present in the .onion address.
Almost all the top 40 HSes requested but no longer 
operating were botnet command and control (C&C) 
servers (Stone-Gross et al. 2009). Botnet C&C servers 
are used to control computers infected with malware 
(called bots) remotely; the bot will connect to the server 
regularly for new instructions or to upload data (such as 
stolen passwords). Malware authors and researchers have 
been involved in a cat-and-mouse game in the last 10 
years, whereby authors have attempted to produce C&C 
servers that are difficult to takedown. Tor has become a 
popular tool for C&C infrastructure, due to the difficulty 
in taking down and locating servers. Interestingly, most 
botnets represented in the dataset had many (as opposed 
to a single) HS addresses, which paradoxically may make 
them more vulnerable to deanonymization attacks if 
these services are distributed across several Tor processes 
(Murdoch and Zielinski 2007; Johnson et al. 2013).
GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES: NO. 20 — SEPTEMBER 2015 
6 • CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION • CHATHAM HOUSE
Table 1: Popularity of No-longer Existent HSes
HS Address Requests/day
Days 
observed
Description
l77ukkijtdca2tsy 679,470 9 Botnet Sefnit
7sc6xyn3rrxtknu6 525,930 11 Botnet Sefnit
pomyeasfnmtn544p 514,766 10 Botnet Sefnit
ceif2rmdoput3wjh 247,296 6 Botnet Sefnit
censored 6,603 10 Child abuse
Source: Authors.
Table 2 shows a cross-section of the widely known onion 
addresses by the number of visitors they received each 
day. Abuse sites were by far the most popular and these 
sites were easily identified by words in the page title or 
by prefixes used on the .onion address. The Hidden Wiki 
also featured and is often used as a starting point for many 
visitors to the Dark Net. It is perhaps surprising, given the 
amount of media attention that Silk Road receives, that the 
number of its requests is fewer than 10,000.
Table 2: Non-sequential Snapshot of Popular HSes
HS Address Requests/
day
Days 
observed
Description
censored 168,152 12 Child abuse
silkroad6ownowfk 8,067 11 Silk Road
agorabasakxmewww 3,035 8 Agora
k5zq47j6wd3wdvjq 2,589 5 Evolution
xmh57jrzrnw6insl 1,341 7 Torch
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m 1,223 4 DuckDuckGo
wikitjerrta4ggz4 555 12 HiddenWiki
mail2tor2zyjdctd 266 8 Mail
Source: Authors.
CLASSIFICATION
There are two representations of the classifications of data, 
the first being the number of sites in each category (see 
Figure 7). Figure 7 shows that the Dark Net’s content is 
diverse, with the largest number of sites beingrepresented 
in the drugs category, but only by a small margin.
When each category is plotted against the percentage of 
HS directory requests it received (using the previous hits 
data), an entirely different picture emerges (see Figure 8). 
Requests to abuse sites represented more than 80 percent 
of total requests observed, although they accounted for 
only two percent of the total HSes available (see Figure 7).
It is important to emphasize what is being measured. 
The popularity data is a measure of the number of HS 
directory requests, and when grouped into content-type 
categories the picture may become somewhat misleading. 
First, law enforcement frequently patrol abuse sites and 
this may inflate the figures; however, crawlers are likely 
to account for a single request in a 24-hour period and we 
are seeing a large number of requests to these sites. Even if 
it’s assumed that all national forces crawl these sites daily, 
they would still only account for a small proportion of the 
total requests. The second possibility is denial of service 
attacks, where one could flood the HS directory with 
requests for descriptors in an effort to take the directory 
offline. This is likely to be ineffective because the attacker 
would need to take all six directories offline and then 
these relays would be dropped from the consensus and 
the responsibility would shift to other relays. It is worth 
noting that most of these sites were observed on several 
random days during the study, so an attack of this nature 
would have to persist for most of the duration of the study. 
While denial of service attacks are impossible to rule out, 
Figure 7: Percentage of Sites in each Classification 
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Figure 8: Percentage of Requests by Classification 
Category
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due to the anonymity offered by Tor, it seems unlikely 
and in any case none of our servers were taken offline or 
received requests far exceeding expectations.
Tor offers a tool called Tor2Web, which allows non-Tor 
users to visit HSes through a web gateway. These web 
gateways will operate one or a small number of Tor clients, 
so although there might be several visitors to a site, only 
one request will be seen because the gateway has cached 
the descriptor; hence, it is possible for some sites to be 
underrepresented in the data if they are largely accessed 
through Tor2Web. The popularity data is the proportion of 
HS directory requests observed on HSes offering a website 
that the authors were able to crawl and classify. One 
should be extremely cautious before trying to link this data 
to a number of users, as the data approximates somewhere 
between visits and visitors. Interpreting the figure as visits 
will underestimate the number of users.
CONNECTIVITY
For each HS website that was crawled, information was 
extracted on the hyperlinks listed on their site. Each link 
was categorized into one of three categories: Dark Net, 
clearnet or own-site. Dark Net links were links to other Tor 
HSes, clearnet links were links to websites that were hosted 
on the Internet (for example, regular non-Tor domains) 
and own-site were links within the site being crawled.
Of the HSes that were crawled, 59 percent did not link to 
any site other than itself, seven percent linked only to other 
Dark Net sites, 23 percent linked only to clearnet sites and 
11 percent linked to both. Aggregating the first two figures, 
one can say that two-thirds of sites were not connected by 
links to any sites outside of the Dark Net.
DEANONYMIZATION OF TOR USERS 
AND HSes
A common misconception is that Tor is resistant to state-
level surveillance and that its users can therefore act with 
impunity. In reality, any suitably resourced entity can 
launch attacks with high success rates while maintaining a 
minimal risk of detection. 
While an observer cannot see where traffic is routed in 
the Tor network, he can treat the network as a black box 
and observe traffic entering and leaving it. An interesting 
analogy would be the postal service, whereby one cannot 
see what happens in the sorting office, but can see how 
many letters/parcels every address posts and receives 
on each day. Assume the intelligence services think that 
two people are pen pals: they can observe letters leaving 
one person and arriving at the other and vice versa. 
Observing the mail of both parties over a period of time 
can give a degree of confidence about whether they are 
communicating with each other without opening their 
mail or tracking it through the postal system.
The postal system analogy may seem like there is a lot 
of room for error, but with Tor, a typical user may send 
millions of letters and an observer can see the precise time 
they were sent and received. It is therefore easy to confirm 
with high probability that two parties are communicating. 
A slightly harder version of this problem occurs when one 
can observe traffic exiting the Tor network to a jihadist 
website: can he identify the original user while still treating 
Tor as a black box? The answer is often yes, provided he 
has enough visibility of traffic entering the Tor network 
to correlate the number of messages, the rate and time at 
which they are sent. One does not need to control guard 
relays to be able to launch traffic correlation attacks; one 
needs to be able to observe traffic between a user and his 
guard even though the traffic cannot be read at that point. 
Recent leaks from Edward Snowden indicate that UK and 
US intelligence services can observe traffic from entire 
countries, enabling them to observe all guards within 
those countries. Guards are presently changed every 30 to 
90 days, so a targeted user may fall within the net at some 
point in the future when global observation is not possible.
While HSes are believed to be the Holy Grail in anonymity 
protection, in reality these correlation attacks are much 
more successful compared with attacks against general web 
browsing through Tor. Typically with HSes, one wishes to 
deanonymize the visitors and the service itself. In the last 
example, with general Tor usage one, was observing traffic 
entering and leaving the Tor network, while with HSes the 
attacker can control one end of the connection and inject 
patterns of traffic to spot. In the case of a user, the attacker 
can control the relay in the DHT and send a specific pattern 
back to the user and try to identify it leaving the network. 
The attacker will be able to identify the service visited and 
the user but not what the user does on the site, because the 
content is encrypted end-to-end between the two parties. 
In some cases, the mere fact a user has visited an HS may 
be enough to gain a conviction (for example, in particular 
where the site contains illegal content on the front page). 
That said, once a user has been identified, his home and 
equipment can be searched, where there may be stored 
evidence of wrongdoing. Thus far, the authors are aware 
of no cases whereby a deanonymization attack alone has 
been used to seek a conviction.
In the case of the service, the attacker can simply connect to 
the HS and send a pattern, and again attempt to identify it 
leaving the Tor network. Deanonymization attacks against 
HSes can be highly successful with very low (even absent) 
false positives.
BLOCKING OF TOR
Tor is often described as being censorship resistant and 
impossible to block — this is not the case. There is a 
misunderstanding of how Tor works and some nations 
have attempted naive approaches that have, predictably, 
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failed. There are many effective approaches to blocking Tor 
and the problem of building a truly censorship-resistant 
network is presently an open one.
When a user wishes to connect to the Tor network, he 
needs a list of all the relays, which he obtains from the 
directory authorities — special relays operated by the Tor 
developers. He then selects a relay from the list that meets 
certain characteristics (principally uptime and bandwidth) 
and chooses this as the first node in any circuit. Since the 
list of relays (known as the consensus) is public, anyone is 
able to download the list and block access to all of them. 
The user would then be unable to connect to the first hop 
and into the network.
An attempt to mitigate these blocking attempts was made 
through the introduction of “bridges.” Bridges are not 
listed in the consensus and one has to visit the Tor Project 
website and enter a CAPTCHA (Completely Automated 
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) to 
obtain a small number of them. The Tor website will only 
release a small fraction of bridges to any one user on any 
one day, which makes it difficult for an attacker to obtain 
the full list and block them.
Notably, China operates a country-wide firewall used 
to censor material that citizens can access. China has 
attempted to block Tor by stopping access to all of the 
relays listed in the consensus as described above (Winter 
and Lindskog 2012). They have also attempted to block 
bridges by looking for connections traversing the firewall 
to see if they met characteristics typical of Tor. This worked 
for some time until the Tor developers modified the 
program so that Tor connections were indistinguishable 
from ordinary web traffic. In response to this, China then 
monitored any encrypted connections and would try to 
connect to the remote server and talk to the Tor protocol: 
if it responded, they concluded it was a Tor relay; if not, it 
was an ordinary website.
There exist, however, many more successful techniques for 
bridge enumeration (Ling, Luo and Yang 2012) — that is, 
detecting potential bridges without asking the Tor Project 
for a list or scanning suspect servers. A simple approach 
is to run a Tor relay and monitor all of the circuits built 
through your relay. It is easy to identify whether you are 
the middle relay, so you can simply identify the previous 
hop and if it is not in the network it is probably a bridge. 
This technique is not foolproof because not all bridges will 
connect through your relay all of the time; hence, you must 
run many relays offering a significant proportion of the 
bandwidth to detect most of them, and even then you will 
only detect most, but not all.
That said, it is believed that these techniques would be 
effective, as only the most determined user would continue 
to persist with a tool that failed most of the time.
HS BLOCKING
While Tor is designed to be resistant to censorship, at 
present HSes are not particularly robust against technical 
attacks (they will resist physical attacks if the operator 
is unknown). At present, groups of individuals or the 
Tor Project itself could choose to block these sites by the 
following methods:
• An individual can block a single site by launching 
several relays and ensuring they occupy the 
positions in the DHT of the responsible relays for 
that service. If someone comes to the relay asking 
for the descriptor, the individual can simply deny it.
• Operators of Tor relays could themselves choose to 
block the content by patching their relays to deny 
requests to these sites. This would require the 
cooperation of a large percentage of relay operators 
to be effective, but it would be a decentralized 
blocking mechanism requiring some consensus.
The Tor Project itself can choose to trivially block the 
content by modifying the Tor program to block requests 
for such sites at the relay and client level. This might seem 
to place a large amount of power into the developer’s 
hands, but it is worth remembering they already control 
the authorities and the consensus, and can abuse this to 
deanonymize users or block sites anyway. At present, 
the Tor Project has stated that it is not willing to censor 
HSes, because it fears it will be a slippery slope with 
future requests widening the categories blocked. This is 
unfortunate because child abuse sites do cause real harm 
and may encourage offenders. The number of requests for 
whistleblowing sites is minuscule in comparison to those 
aimed at child abusers.
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CONCLUSION
This paper does suggest that child abuse content is the 
most popular type of content on the Tor Dark Net. While 
law enforcement may crawl such sites, the number of 
requests that would be seen would be only a tiny fraction, 
and hence not skew the outline ratios. Similarly, denial of 
service attacks were not observed and so are also unlikely 
to account for the high requests. The usage of Tor2Web 
may underrepresent some categories, but it is not currently 
clear whether, or why, such groups would exclusively use 
this tool. 
An explicit categorization of sites into illegal and legal 
was not undertaken, but it was abundantly clear to the 
authors that the majority of sites were of questionable 
legality. While anonymity and privacy tools such as Tor 
might fight online surveillance, they also give an easy and 
accessible route for those with criminal motivations. There 
are alternatives, such as botnets, available for criminal 
activity, but these do not negate the comparative ease with 
which Tor can be used.
It is technically possible to block Tor, although it is likely 
that the Tor Project will deploy countermeasures resulting 
in the endeavour descending into a cat-and-mouse game 
of “circumvent-and-censor.” In any case, Tor does not 
provide the absolute impunity that is often attributed to it.
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